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A TAX FORMULA TO RESTORE THE IDSTORICAL 
EFFECTS OF THE ANTITRUST TREBLE 
DAMAGE PROVISIONS 
(An Open Letter to The Senate Antitrust 
and Monopoly Subcommittee) 
L. Hart Wright* 
I. CURRENTLY PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
FOLLOWING the well-publicized criminal conviction of a major segment of our electrical equipment industry for conspiring to 
fix and maintain prices, terms, and conditions of sales made to both 
private industry and the government, almost 2,000 private antitrust 
treble damage suits were brought against those convicted. In July, 
1964, when at least 1,500 of these suits were still pending,1 the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue publicly announced that amounts 
paid or "incurred" by the defendants in those actions to private 
plaintiffs, either pursuant to judgment or by way of settlement, to-
gether with legal expenses pertaining thereto, were deductible as 
ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162(a) of 
the Code.2 In his ruling, the Commissioner construed the treble 
damage provision to be nothing more than a formula seized upon by 
Congress to assure plaintiffs of complete recovery for all injury suf-
fered, not as a means of meting out punishment qua punishment 
to wrongdoers. Amounts paid in response to civil damage suits 
brought by the United States, however, were ruled not deductible. 
Although bearing a resemblance to restitution, these amounts, be-
cause paid over to the public's own representative, were deemed 
more closely akin to another class of payments-namely, fines or 
penalties-which the Supreme Court specifically had held to be 
nondeductible.3 
That part of the ruling allowing a deduction for amounts paid 
to private litigants drew immediate and sharp criticism from the 
chairmen of the antitrust subcommittees of both houses of Congress, 
Senator Hart and Representative Celler. The deduction, they ar-
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. This article is drawn from a statement 
made by the writer to the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee on July 27, 
1966.-Ed. 
I. Indeed, 1,453 cases were still pending on January I, 1965. See 1965 REPORT OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF TIIE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 87, II9, summarized in 
5 TRADE REG. REP. ,r 50125 (1965). The Annual Reports of the Director of the Adminis-
trative Office are bound, and paginated, as part of the Judicial Conference Reports. 
2. Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 CUM. BULL. 52. 
3. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). 
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gued, resulted in passing a substantial part of a defendant's treble 
damage costs to the federal treasury. This, it was thought, "would 
lessen the treble damage penalty Congress had established ... " and 
would thereby "hamper effective antitrust enforcement . . . ."4 At 
the behest of these two critics, the chairmen of the tax committees 
of the two chambers agreed to initiate a study of the whole matter, 
utilizing the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue 
Taxation.5 
Before that study was completed, however, Senator Hart, along 
with Senator Burdick, introduced S. 24796 as an amendment to the 
Clayton Act. The obvious purpose of this bill is to deny a deduction 
for any part of treble damages paid under sections 4 or 4A of the 
Clayton Act7 if these damages are paid pursuant to a judgment or 
in settlement of any action previously brought, whether or not the 
defendant previously had been convicted of a criminal violation. 
The bill seeks to accomplish this result by treating all such amounts, 
for purposes "of any statute of the United States ... ," as a "penalty 
imposed upon such defendant by the United States ... " itself.8 
Two months after the Hart-Burdick bill was introduced, the 
staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation pub-
lished its own study.9 As to amounts paid to private litigants in anti-
trust treble damage actions, the staff proposed a tax limitation which, 
on two principal counts, is much less sweeping than that contained in 
4. Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Press Release, Aug. 21, 1964, 
republished in STAFF OF JOINT COMMl1TEE ON INTERNAL REvENUE TAXATION, STUDY OF 
INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF TREBLE DAMAGE PAYMENTS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAws 
44 (1965) [hereinafter cited as STAFF STUDY]. 
5. Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Press Release, Nov. 18, 1964, 
republished in STAFF STUDY, at 45. 
6. The bill was introduced on August 30, 1965. 
7. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15(a) (1964). 
8. The sponsors obviously assumed this classification would be enough to bring 
the payments within the rule of Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 
(1958). Literally speaking, however, to pin the mere label "penalty" on such payments 
would leave open the issue whether a deduction for this particular type of "penalty" 
would so frustrate sharply defined national policies proscribing particular forms of 
conduct as to bring the penalty within the Tank Truck Rentals principle. But to 
conclude from this, as did former Commissioner Caplin, that "no one can provide 
a definitive answer to whether S. 2479 would accomplish its purpose • • • ," is to 
make a mountain out of a molehill, for Mr. Caplin's conclusion completely ignores 
the decisive role that S. 2479's legislative history would play in the interpretative 
process. See statement of Mortimer M. Caplin, before the Senate Antitrust and Mo• 
nopoly Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, in Hearings on S. 2479, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess., July 29, 1966 (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). If S. 2479 
is passed, its single purpose will be so sharply identified in legislative history as to 
preclude the Court from reaching a result at odds with that purpose. Under standards 
of interpretation too well established to justify citation, the very fact that Tank Truck 
Rentals had been decided before S. 2479 was passed would itself be enough to force the 
Court to go behind, the literal language of the provision and to examine the statute's 
legislative history. 
9. STAFF STUDY. 
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S. 2479. The proposal would deny a deduction only as to two-thirds 
of the amount paid, the remaining one-third being left deductible 
because it is deemed to constitute payment for the actual provable 
damage suffered.1° Further, even the prohibition of deductibility 
as to the two-thirds would apply only in the case of "hard core vio-
lations,"11 where intent to violate had been clearly proved on the 
basis of the most demanding evidentiary standard. In short, the 
prohibition would be triggered only if the violation alleged in the 
civil suit also had led to a criminal conviction, or was a related 
violation which had occurred prior to the actual date of the con-
viction.12 Just nvo days before the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly 
Subcommittee, of which Senator Hart is chairman, was to begin 
hearings on the Hart-Burdick bill, a competing bill which would 
implement the proposal made by the staff of the Joint Committee 
was introduced by Senator Russell Long as an amendment to the 
Internal Revenue Code and was referred to the Senate Finance 
Committee, of which Senator Long is chairman.13 
II. THE HISTORICAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TREBLE "DAMAGE 
PROVISION HAS BEEN REDUCED ON Two CouNTs, 
NOT JUST ONE 
Before examining the merits of these competing legislative pro-
posals, it is important to note that the recent date of the Commis-
sioner's ruling, combined with the fact that the ruling was debata-
ble, had an unfortunate effect. It led both the sponsors of S. 2479 
and the staff of the Joint Committee to focus exclusively on the 
deduction side of the treble damage tax question. Both completely 
neglected the income side although, in terms of effective enforce-
ment of our antitrust laws, the income question may pose the more 
serious problem. The treble damage provision was enacted, at least 
in part, to stimulate privately injured parties to complement the 
limited capability of the Justice Department in enforcing the na-
tion's antitrust policies.14 For a long period prior to 1955, the incen-
IO. Id. at 13. 
11. Id. at 15. 
12. The inclusion of "related" violations was intended to cover the "type of situa-
tion where only a few out of a series of related actions give rise to specific indict-
ments." Id. at 15. 
13. S. 3650, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). 
14. The Attorney General recently said: 
In addition, a great number of cases make it clear that the primary purpose 
of Congress in providing a private treble damage remedy was to harness private 
interests as an aid to the Government in antitrust law enforcement and thus to 
further the public interest in deterring antitrust violations. 
E.g., Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52, 757 (1947); Olympic 
Refining Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 264 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964): 
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tive for the private litigant included the prospect, according to that 
era's most closely related judicial precedents, that a recipient of 
treble damages could exclude from his gross income that portion of 
the amount recovered (two-thirds) which some have characterized 
as "punitive"15 damages.16 Indeed, as late as the early 1950's, the 
Tax Court thought the principle on which an exclusion for two-
thirds rested had so "long been established" that the court used 
only one short paragraph to justify the exclusion.17 Not until 1955 
did the Supreme Court eliminate this prospect by denying such an 
exclusion.18 That event, if realistically appraised, did reduce the 
Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 324 F.2d 566, 572 (4th Cir. 1963); Quemos Theater 
Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D.N.J. 1940). Congress itself 
has made this clear: "The damages of 'persons' are trebled so that private persons will 
be encouraged to bring actions which, though brought to enforce a private claim, will 
nonetheless serve the public interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws." S. REP. 
No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955); Letter From Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to 
Mr. Laurence N. Woodworth, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue 
Taxation, Feb. 8, 1965, republished in STAFF STUDY at 60-62. 
The then Attorney General also might have added that Senator Sherman himself 
had commented as follows: 
The measure of damages, whether merely compensatory, putative, or vindic-
tive, is a matter of detail depending upon the judgment of Congress. My own 
opinion is that the damages should be commensurate with the difficulty of main-
taining a private suit against a combination such as is described. 
I think myself the rule of damages is too small. It provides double the dam-
ages [changed to treble damages prior to passage] and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
Very few actions will probably be brought, but the cases that will be brought 
will be by men of spirit, who will contest against these combinations. 
21 CONG. R.Ec. 2456, 2569 (1890). 
Even the most outspoken critic of the Commissioner's ruling on the deduction 
question, Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman of th'e House Committee on the 
Judiciary and of its Antitrust Subcommittee, acknowledges that the treble damage 
provision does reflect a policy " 'to encourage effective private antitrust enforce-
ment • • • .' " He argued, however, in the words of Justice Cardozo, that "'the 
same provision may be penal as to the offender and remedial as to the sufferer.' " 
See Statement of Representative Emanuel Celler to Joint Committee on Internal Rev-
enue Taxation, STAFF STUDY 46, 54. 
15. Even the :Supreme Court has so characterized it. Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Com-
missioner, 348 U.S. 426, 427 (1955). But cf. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892). 
16. This prospect was ultimately traceable to the conclusion in the early case of 
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920), "that income included only the ••• 
gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.'' Cf. Central R. 
R. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1935); Highland Farms Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 42 B.T.A. 1314: (1940). The prospect was not neutralized in 1941 when the 
Service published its non-acquiescence to the Board of Tax Appeals' decision in 
Highland Farms Corp., which accorded immunity to punitive damages. The Service's 
non-acquiescence indicated only that a plaintiff in a treble damage action (I) would 
have to litigate the tax issue if he hoped to realize upon the "prospect" that the 
judiciary would treat the entire two-thirds as excludable, or (2) would have to yield 
immunity as to part of the two-thirds if he hoped to arrive at an administrative 
"settlement" of the issue with a field office empowered with complete settlement 
authority. 
17. Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 860, 868 (1952), aff'd, 211 F.2d 
928 (3d Cir. 1954), rev'd, 348 U.S. 4:26 (1955). 
18. Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 17. However, the Service has 
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incentive-to-sue purpose historically associated with the treble dam-
age provision. Until 1955, potential plaintiffs, before deciding 
whether to sue, could anticipate, by reference to prior judicial 
authority, at least a fifty-fifty chance of enjoying tax immunity as 
to two-thirds of any treble damages recovered. That stimulating 
possibility was reduced to zero by the High Court's 1955 decision. 
In consequence, if the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Sub-
committee, to which S. 2479 has been referred, is really interested in 
restoring the effect historically associated with the treble damage 
provision, the scope of its study regarding S. 2479 should be en-
larged to include the stimulant side of the treble damage provision. 
This "stimulant" becomes particularly significant in cases where 
the potential plaintiff has to "go it alone," without the benefit of 
a prima facie case supplied by a decision previously obtained in an 
action brought by the government. Also relevant is the fact that 
not once in its 1955 decision did the Supreme Court refer to the 
potential adverse effect of its decision on the nation's antitrust 
policies; the decision was bottomed solely on technical tax consider-
ations. Further, although the treble damage provision has made the 
private action what one very knowledgeable person, Mr. Lee 
Loevinger, has described as "the strongest pillar of antitrust,"19 
nevertheless, that same person, shortly before becoming Assistant 
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, indicated that 
all was far from well with respect to antitrust enforcement. He 
observed: 
[T]he burden of antitrust litigation is so great that private parties 
are often unable or unwilling to undertake such lawsuits regardless 
of the violations involved or the injuries suffered. Congress and the 
country have heard many articulate spokesmen for antitrust defen-
dants complain of the heavy burden of defending antitrust prosecu-
tion, because of the mass of evidence involved, the length of the 
trial, the complexity of the issues, and the time required of the 
businessman involved. But it should be apparent that this burden 
is even greater for a plaintiff in such case than for the defendant. 
It is greater for the plaintiff because the plaintiff has the burden 
of proof, the burden of discovering and presenting evidence-and 
evidence which is usually in the possession of the defendants-
and the burden of initiating and going forward with the case which 
the defendant is later called upon to answer . . . . As a practical 
matter, a business victim of antitrust violation cannot undertake any 
not yet published a ruling and the courts have not yet passed on the question of whether 
any part of the treble damages received by a buyer, because of a violation in the 
nature of price fixing, can be treated instead as a reduction in the purchase price of 
the equipment acquired by the buyer from the wrongdoer. 
19. Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 .ANTITRusr BULL. 
167, 172 (1958). 
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action for vindication of his rights unless he is willing and able to 
wait at least two or three years-and often longer-for the decision 
of his case, is able to advance at least several thousand dollars in 
probable costs of preparing and presenting his case, and is prepared 
to withstand the social and economic pressures and the threat of 
reprisal and retaliation that not infrequently are the lot of the anti-
trust plaintiff.20 
Compared with the proposal made by the staff of the Joint 
Committee, S. 2479 would provide greater assurance-if such assur-
ance is needed--of voluntary compliance with the nation's antitrust 
laws, but even its more sweeping penalty will not deter offenses 
unless potential antitrust violators anticipate rigorous enforcement, 
much of which must come from the private sector. But, according 
to the previously quoted Mr. Loevinger, treble damages-as an 
incentive to induce private parties to assume the inescapably heavy 
burdens of otherwise justified antitrust litigation-are actually not 
as stimulating as they may appear to be at first blush: 
The treble damage recovery is sometimes referred to as something 
of a windfall for plaintiffs. In actual practice this is not the case. 
It is virtually never possible for a plaintiff to show by tangible 
evidence of the kind demanded by courts the full amount of his 
damages. Further, the deprivation of business and profits over a 
long period of time always involves a business handicap that is 
never taken into account or compensated. The unrecoverable ex-
penses of litigation are always very substantial. The time and 
trouble of the plaintiff in pursuing his lawsuit are never considered. 
Finally, it is almost always necessary for a plaintiff to pay a sub-
stantial part of any recovery for legal expenses and attorneys' fees 
which are not fully compensated by any court award. When all these 
factors are taken into account, it would be a rare and fortunate 
plaintiff who came out of an antitrust suit with a net recovery 
amounting to full compensation for his actual damages.21 
Finally, in cases where a plaintiff must "go it alone," without 
benefit of a prior adjudication by the Justice Department, S. 2479, 
by disallowing a deduction for any amount paid by the defendant, 
may actually induce the latter to make the plaintiff's demanding 
and not so rewarding task even more burdensome than now, for 
this bill would increase the stakes of antitrust litigation only in the 
eyes of the defendant and would provide no commensurate advan-
tage to potential plaintiffs, who are the potential private enforce-
ment agents of the nation's antitrust policies. Ironically enough, on 
the other hand, the proposal made by the staff of the Joint Com-
mittee, which would restrict the disallowance of a deduction by the 
20. Id. at 169. (Emphasis added.) 
21. Id. at 173. (Emphasis added.) 
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wrongdoer to those private cases in which a criminal conviction had 
been obtained previously by the Justice Department, applies a rela-
tively more severe punishment in the very situation where the Jus-
tice Department has done much of the private plaintiff's work for 
him by providing him with a prima fade case of violation. 
The foregoing is not intended to suggest, however, that the 
deduction question does not deserve congressional attention. Given 
the Commissioner's technical interpretation allowing such a deduc-
tion, given the fact that he is not likely to change that interpretative 
position, and given the further fact that his decision, whether right 
or wrong, did in fact reduce the threat historically associated with 
the treble damage provision, Congress at least should consider the 
policy question of whether the historic threat associated with the 
treble damage provision needs to be maintained. 
In one sense, of course, the Commissioner's ruling, now water 
over the dam, is a debating point to which some might attribute 
mere tactical significance. At the least, it has that significance: those 
who do favor a statutory amendment to reverse or modify the rul-
ing's effect would enjoy some tactical advantage if they could dem-
onstrate that the amendment would merely correct an administra-
tive error and would not change the law. Others who claim that 
the Commissioner's administrative ruling reached the right result 
cannot also argue with equal persuasion that the ruling left un-
changed the historic threat previously associated with the treble 
damage provision. The fact is that the ruling reduced the appre-
hension of potential violators by making certain what for decades 
had been quite uncertain. The substantial in terrorem effect of the 
previous uncertainty regarding the deduction question was thereby 
neutralized. Proof that, prior to the recent ruling, the technical 
answer to the deduction question was "by no means clear" can be 
found in the well-documented technical study published by the 
staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation.22 
Indeed, on the basis of the analysis contained in that study, it is 
easy to conclude that, at least as to two-thirds of any treble damages 
paid, the Commissioner could not have reached the result which he 
did if, preliminarily, he had chosen to approach the substantive issue 
from the posture of an advocate who is willing to litigate an im-
portant matter although he may tend to believe the odds are some-
what against him. Had he viewed the matter solely from the stand-
point of an advocate, the Commissioner no doubt also could have 
anticipated the subsequently articulated view of the Attorney Gen-
eral, who informed the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Tax-
22. See STAFF STUDY. 
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ation that the Justice Department "would have been prepared to 
defend in court a rule of complete nondeductibility.''23 However, 
there are substantial reasons for believing that the Commissioner in 
fact, and with propriety in this particular instance, chose to resolve 
the debatable substantive issue, not by reference to the standards 
of an advocate, but rather by reference to a standard closely resem-
bling impartiality,24 that is, on the basis of an impartial appraisal of 
competing precedents25 read in the context of competing bits of 
legislative history.26 Appraised in this light and viewed as a purely 
technical matter, the consequent ruling clearly was not unreason-
able. Nevertheless, that other conscientious, able, and legally 
23. See STAFF STUDY 61. 
24. When the author first asserted, in hearings before the Senate Antitrust and 
Monopoly Subcommittee, that the Commissioner chose to pursue a posture of impar• 
tiality rather than that of an advocate, reliance was placed on a fairly intimate ac-
quaintance with the person who then served as Commissioner, attributing to him not 
only intellectual integrity but also exceptional ability. The latter quality was deemed 
relevant because only on the basis of an "impartial" stance did the ruling tend to 
make sense. Subsequently, in the same hearings, that individual stated that he had 
tried to view the question impartially and justified the choice of this posture by 
referring to Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 CUM. Buu.. 689, which calls upon Service person• 
nel to resolve questions "in a fair and impartial manner, with neither a government 
nor a taxpayer point of view." See Statement of Mortimer M. Caplin, supra note 8. 
While this writer believes that there are circumstances where Commissioners have 
and should adopt the role of an advocate who is willing to litigate an important 
matter even though he may tend to believe the odds on which side would prevail in 
court were a bit against him, the mere fact that some doubt exists in the Commis• 
sioner's own mind regarding the "conect" technical answer cannot always be an ade-
quate justification for his ruling adversely to the taxpayer. In our complex society, 
there are transactions which vary one from another in every shade of degree. Add to 
that the further fact that every word which Congress uses in the tax code-and that 
code has more words than any other statute known to the civilized world-is more 
likely than not to have diverse shades of meaning. These factors react upon each other 
to produce, as a cumulative result, a potentially enormous number of cases involving 
diverse degrees of doubt. In fiscal 1965, the Commissioner's rulings personnel received 
over 20,000 requests for substantive rulings. Many involved one degree of doubt or 
another. To rule adversely in every case just because the case involves some doubt 
would be both unjust and certain to inundate the judiciary. Indeed, even now, of the 
6,852 tax cases petitioned to the Tax Court in fiscal 1965, most of which had not even 
been the subject of a prior National Office ruling, at least 85%, or 5,800, will have to 
be settled administratively, for that court has a yearly capacity of not over 1,000 cases. 
Further, the cumulative impact of four considerations suggests that it surely was 
not unreasonable for the Commissioner to conclude in this particular case that our 
legal order would be better served if he approached this issue as impartially as pos• 
sible: (1) both the judiciary and the Justice Department had expressed alarm at the 
court congestion caused by the unprecedented mass of antitrust litigation then pend-
ing; (2) an administrative tax ruling based on the stance of a mere advocate was 
· almost certain to be adverse to the interested taxpayers; (3) the degree to which mere 
advocacy supports an administrative ruling can be readily detected by knowledgeable 
outside tax lawyers; and (4) there was a significant possibility-in the light of a 48% 
tax rate-that a ruling predicated on mere advocacy might well have postponed set• 
tlement of a significant part of the private antitrust litigation then congesting the 
courts until the tax ruling could be tested in court. 
25. These are adequately marshalled in the Staff Study. 
26. Ibid. 
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trained persons may have tended to disagree with the ruling27 sug-
gests that lawyers who had been counseling potential antitrust vio-
lators over the many years prior to that ruling could not have given 
anything like complete assurance that damages awarded as the result 
of a possible violation would be deductible. The ruling, therefore, 
did reduce the previously prevailing degree of apprehension associ-
ated with the potential cost of an antitrust violation. This reduction 
of apprehension caused by the Commissioner's 1964 ruling had 
existed for almost two years when the Supreme Court, in a decision 
relating to a quite different matter, refined i~ ideas in such a way 
as to increase the likelihood that the Court would have reached the 
same conclusion as did the Commissioner, namely, that treble dam-
age payments are deductible.28 Although the Court's reasoning un-
doubtedly comforted the now departed Commissioner who was 
responsible for the administrative ruling discussed here,29 the direc-
tion which the Supreme Court took, like the direction of the 
Commissioner's own ruling, was something for which, during the 
many years preceding this decision, apprehensive potential violators 
could only hope. 
III. A TAX FORMULA To R.EsTORE THE H1sToruc BALANCE 
Ultimately, we shall find that the principal sponsor of S. 2479 
went too far on the deterrence side and not far enough on the stimu-
lant side if the bill was intended to be responsive only to his as-
serted concern over the recent tendency to "lessen"30 the historical 
thrust and effectiveness of the treble damage provision. Resort to 
a tax formula as a means of restoring the stimulant and deterrence 
historically associated with the treble damage provision is certain 
to draw fire, however, not just from the front, but also from both 
flanks. 
From one side will come the type of argument which is reflected 
in a recent report of the Tax Section of the American Bar Associ-
27. See the conclusion of the staff of the Joint Committee and that contained in 
a brief filed by Representative Celler, in STAFF STUDY at 9, 47. 
28. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966). While the precise subject matter 
of that decision (allowance of a deduction for attorney's fees incurred in an unsuc-
cessful defense of a criminal prosecution for illegal business activities) is beyond the 
scope of this discussion, it should be noted that Congress, in dealing with proposed 
legislation, should not assume that the public policy considerations associated with a 
deduction for treble damages are identical to those bearing on a deduction for the 
above attorney's fees. Indeed, as the Court itself put the latter matter: "No public 
policy is offended when a man faced with serious criminal charges employs a lawyer 
to help in his defense. That is not 'proscribed conduct.' It is his constitutional right." 
Id. at 694. 
29. That it did, see Statement of Mortimer M. Caplin, supra note 8. 
30. STAFF STUDY 47. (Emphasis added.) 
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ation, opposi_ng S. 2479: "Moreover, the Section does not believe it 
is wise tax policy to attempt to achieve social goals in other areas by 
manipulation of tax provisions."31 It would be one thing if this 
meant only that a Commissioner, in discharging his interpretative 
function, should not torture statutory tax language in order to 
achieve non-tax social goals. But it is quite another thing to so limit 
Congress even should it contemplate the adoption of a completely 
new tax effect to accomplish that same end. A more appropriate 
guideline for congressional action even in that circumstance is to 
ask, as another has pµt it, "whether or not it is possible to achieve 
that goal more efficiently, directly, and fairly through other meas-
ures which lie outside the realm of the tax system."32 Further, if 
the sponsors of S. 2479 actually had intended to propose the adopt-
tion of a new tax effect, thus making the foregoing standard rele-
vant here, it would be appropriate to acknowledge the possibility 
that the treble damage provision itself could be changed so as to 
compensate roughly for the extent to which its historic thrust has 
been reduced by the fairly recent events previously described. But 
to expect resort to this latter approach by those whose only aim is 
to restore the historic contribution of tax effects to antitrust enforce-
ment is to expect them to shoulder a substantial diversionary tac-
tical burden. Argument on the real issue, in itself quite complicated, 
necessarily must center in the first instance on whether a realistic 
appraisal of tax history indicates that two fairly recent tax events 
did in fact reduce the overall thrust of the treble damage provision. 
To expect the sponsors of S. 2479 also to assume the additional and 
diversionary chore of translating the demonstrated reduction in 
tax effects into a quantum of damages is to ask them to complicate 
further the already complicated, and to pay a tactically high price 
merely to satisfy puritans who, ignoring history, argue only that the 
end sought relates to a non-tax social goal. The choice of the par-
ticular USCA volume into which the remedial provision should be 
fitted is just not that important. Even if the end sought is deemed 
non-tax in character, the bill would not be plowing new ground. 
The instances in which Congress has used a tax effect to accomplish 
non-tax societal purposes are too numerous to recount here, ranging 
as they do, for example, from our longstanding percentage deple-
31. American Bar Ass'n, Bull. Sec. Tax., April 1966 (No. 3), p. 32. 
32. Remarks by the Honorable Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Trea-
sury, before the Tax Executives Institute, March 7, 1966 (copy on file with the Michigan 
Law Review); cf. Lindsay, Tax Deductions and Public Policy, 41 TAXES 711 (1963); 
Paul, The Use of Public Policy by the Commissioner in Disallowing Deductions, U. 
So. CAL. 1954 TAX !Nsr. 715. 
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tion arrangement,33 through the relatively recent investment credit 
provision,84 to the quite recent interest equalization tax35 which 
was enacted only because it would contribute to the solution of our 
balance-of-payments problem. 
From the other flank comes the charge that S. 2479 should be 
put aside because it represents only a "piecemeal solution to one 
small problem in this area."36 The staff of the Joint Committee 
-understandably interested in preserving the tax logic and tax 
symmetry of the tax code-shares this view, arguing that it would be 
"inappropriate" to adopt a bill limiting deductions for treble dam-
ages if the bill fails also to deal with the non-deductibility of pay-
ments arising out of other types of improper conduct, such as fines, 
bribes, and illegal kickbacks.37 
While Senator Long did deal with fines, bribes, and kickbacks 
in the bill (S. 3650) which he introduced to implement the staff's 
proposed treatment of treble damages, there are two reasons which 
indicate that careful consideration of the competing Hart-Burdick 
bill (S. 2479) should not hinge on its failure to consider these re-
lated problems. First, but perhaps least important, isolation of the 
treble damage provision can be justified on the ground that the 
Judiciary Committees-charged as they are with the duty of foster-
ing effective antitrust laws-provide a more appropriate forum than 
do the tax committees for the initial reconsideration of the desired 
overall impact of the treble damage provisions. Second, the magni-
tude of the immediate policy concerns stemming from one type of 
improper conduct easily may dwarf those associated with another. 
For example, as the staff of the Joint Committee acknowledges, we 
know that even now the courts will not permit a deduction for fines 
and penalties38 and no serious policy concern has been manifested 
with respect to that substantive result. The same rule appears to 
apply to bribes paid to public officials.39 While one procedural ques-
tion bearing on the disallowance of deductions for bribes does merit 
attention,4° Congress is not remiss when it puts first things first. 
The imminence and magnitude of legitimate policy concerns re-
33. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 613. 
34. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 38. 
35. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4911-20. 
36. See note 31 supra. 
37. See STAFF STUDY 14. 
38. See id. at 16; Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). 
39. Cf. Ruge! v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1942); Samuel Guralnick v. 
Commissioner, 14 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1[ 90 (1955). 
40. The question is whether, absent a criminal conviction, the Commissioner or 
the alleged wrongdoer should carry the burden of proof. 
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garding the overall tax treatment of these other related payments41 
is dwarfed by the need for an immediate re-appraisal of the treble 
damage provision in terms of the ultimate effects desired by the 
Congress. For, as previously explained, two fairly recent events have 
operated in significant ways to reduce what historically were the 
stimulating and deterring effects of the provision. 
The only remaining real •issue is whether these two events, taken 
together and in the context of what normally will be a 48% tax 
rate, reduced those effects below the level required for effective en-
forcement of the nation's antitrust policies. Since the proper reso-
lution of that issue requires both expertise in the antitrust field and 
scientific, objectively oriented data which even antitrust experts 
probably lack, this writer, a mere student of taxation, cannot do 
more than suggest a tax formula which would roughly restore the 
stimulating and deterring effects of the treble damage provision to 
the level which existed before the 1955 Supreme Court decision 
and the Commissioner's 1964 ruling. 
On the stimulant side, the prime problem relates to those plain-
tiffs who must "go it alone," not having been furnished a prima 
fade case through prior adjudication by the Justice Department. 
But, even in this situation, to reverse Glenshaw Glass by statutory 
amendment and thereby immunize from tax two-thirds of any treble 
damages received would do more than restore the quality of the 
stimulant which existed prior to that decision. Until that event, 
potential plaintiffs no doubt thought they would have at least a 
fifty-fifty chance of enjoying complete tax immunity as to two-thirds 
of the damages recovered. To restore the historic balance, it would 
be enough, roughly speaking, to assure them an exclusion as to one-
third of an award. Or, to satisfy tax logicians who insist that the 
entire two-thirds either does or does not constitute "income," the 
historic effect could be restored by according capital gain treatment 
(with its ceiling rate of. 25%) to the· two-thirds. Neither arrange-
ment would involve a greater distortion of basic tax principles in 
the interest of a non-tax social purpose than is found in the per-
centage depletion or investment credit provisions. Indeed, it would 
not even be the first time we have distorted the capital gain con-
cept in order to achieve social goals. For example, professional in-
ventors can receive capital gain benefits on the sale or exchange of 
their patent rights, 42 whereas similar benefits are not allowed artists 
41. This is so although the substantive tax effect of kickbacks also warrants atten• 
tion. See STAFF STUDY 14-17, 
42. INT. REv, COP!!: QF 1954, § 1235. 
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and oµiers, the obvious purpose being to stimulate technological 
progress. 
To permit the- plaintiff who had to "go it alone" either an 
exclusion for one-third or capital gain treatment for two-thirds of 
the treble damages received would mean that the Treasury would 
absorb in each year a dollar amount equal approximately to one-
sixth of the treble damages received during that year. A rough 
way to make the defendant in a treble damage action absorb the 
cost of restoring this stimulating bonus would be to disallow a 
deduction for one-third of the treble damages paid. On the one 
hand, this limitation on the deduction is less sweeping than that 
contained in S. 2479, which would deny a deduction for any part 
of the damages. However, the denial of a deduction only as to one-
third of any treble damages paid by a defendant who is not subjected 
to a criminal sanction more closely approximates the risk value, 
before the Commissioner's recent ruling, of that type of potential 
violator's tax apprehensions,43 and, therefore, would come closer 
to restoring the historic balance than would S. 2479. On the other 
hand, this proposed arrangement would go beyond the suggestion 
made by the staff of the Joint Committee, which would have re-
stricted disallowance of a deduction to those perhaps morally more 
culpable defendants who also were convicted, on the basis of a 
higher evidentiary standard, of a criminal violation, although dis-
allowance as to these defendants would extend, under the staff's pro-
posal, to two-thirds of the treble damages paid in response either to a 
judgment or any settlement reached after an action had been filed. 
The staff's suggestion could be used, however, to complement the 
arrangement proposed herein, which bears primarily upon cases in 
which the plaintiff had to "go it alone," although it should be ac-
knowledged that, before the Commissioner's recent ruling, _the risk 
43. At best this is only a rough approximation. Indeed, historically speaking, the 
odds or degree of risk bearing on the deduction question necessarily have changed 
from time to time, concurrently with nice changes in the total legal climate. Further, 
the degree of risk prevailing at any one point of time has never been exactly the 
same even among all situations otherwise falling within this particular category (no 
criminal conviction). For example, among antitrust cases which did reach final judg-
ment, the odds that the judiciary would permit a deduction were greater if the judg-
ment in the antitrust case rested on a decision which, although theoretically only 
interpretative in character, actually developed a new antitrust norm. In this circum-
stance, the defendant would be favored with the additional argument that, when the 
violation occurred, the national antitrust policy in question was not "sharply defined." 
Cf. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952). At one point in history, the Service 
itself was attracted to this distinction, although its view was not then published. 
STAFF STUDY 28. Finally, the odds favoring a deduction also improved substantially if 
the payment to the private plaintiff was responsive, not to a judgment, but to a set-
tlement in which the defendant expressly disclaimed any violation. 
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value of the tax apprehensions suffered by potential criminal vi-
olators of the antitrust laws was probably closer to 50% than to the 
staff's proposed 66%. 
A final problem, not previously dealt with herein, involves the 
case where the Government, instead of trying to secure a criminal 
conviction, provides potential private plaintiffs with a prima fade 
case by having proceeded against the defendant in a civil suit. While 
the need, if any, to accord either a partial exclusion or a partial 
capital gain treatment to these potential private plaintiffs obviously 
is not as great as in the "go-it-alone" cases, the historical tax stimu-
lant was the same in the two cases prior to the Supreme Court's 
1955 decision. Further, the historical argument which was previously 
made for denying a deduction for one-third of the treble damages 
paid by a defendant not criminally convicted is equally applicable 
to a situation in which a civil judgment has been rendered against 
the defendant. 
Both the more limited disallowance suggested herein and the 
Joint Committee staff's complementary proposal (that two-thirds of 
the damages paid be disallowed if the defendant also had been crim-
inally convicted) can be synchronized adequately with existing tax 
principles. For Congress has the power to define exactly to what de-
gree something frustrates national policy and, therefore, it may de-
termine that, to the extent noted, the allowance of a deduction 
would involve just such a frustration of policy. More succinctly, as 
S. 2479 puts it, to this extent, those payments shall be equated 
with penalties otherwise payable to the United States itself. 
JV. CONCLUSION 
Two principal conclusions should be drawn from the discussion 
in this article. First, since both the stimulating and deterring effects 
of the treble damage provision have been reduced by two different 
events occurring in the last decade, the sponsors of S. 2479 should 
deal with both aspects if they are genuinely interested in restoring 
the historical effectiveness of that provision. Second, since the Com-
missioner is the Government's own agent, since the technical result 
he reached was not an unreasonable interpretation under existing 
law, and since subsequent private antitrust settlements undoubtedly 
were influenced by his ruling, any new legislation should not be 
made retroactive. 
